**Anti-inference bias in the context of inadmissible evidence**

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**Abstract**

Previous work demonstrated the existence of an anti-inference bias. This bias shows that people are unwilling to judge a defendant responsible for causing a damage based on non-direct evidence. Although the anti-inference bias can be moderated by factors such as gain versus loss frames, it is robust to a series of debiasing techniques and cannot be explained by factors like people’s tendency to assign low subjective probabilities to circumstantial evidence. The aim of the present work is to investigate whether the anti-inference bias emerges even when people are told that some information has been deemed to be inadmissible and therefore should be disregarded when imposing liability. In Study 1, we showed that when people are presented with the direct evidence after reading the inference version of the case, they change their judgment despite being told that the additional information cannot be used to make a decision. In Study 2, we counterbalanced the order of the two versions of the case (direct and inference) and found that in both cases decisions are influenced despite the fact that they should not. Overall, this work contributes to the literature by showing an additional case in which the anti-inference bias emerges, despite the fact that, from a formal point of view, people should not be influenced by it. Our findings have possible applied implication, but additional work is required to strengthen the present conclusions and solve some of the limitations of the present experiments.